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Abstract: We investigate whether lending by the Islamic Development Bank mirrors Saudi Arabia’s 
political interests based on religious affinity using panel data for its 56 member countries over 
the 1970 to 2007 period. Our results indicate that Sunni regime countries receive favorable treatment 
in terms of loan allocation, as well as Shia majority populated countries in exceptional occasions of 
conflict with other religious minority groups, while non-Muslim countries are the least favored. There 
is also evidence that lending by the World Bank to the same group of countries and over the same 
time frame does not respond to the political stance of Saudi Arabia founded on religion. These 
findings reveal the advantage that Saudi Arabia gains by assuming the leadership of a Regional 
Development Bank in contrast to coordinating common strategies in a global International Financial 
Institution with other large shareholders for whom religion might not be essential for political 
alliances. 
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1. Introduction 
The establishment of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) is often perceived as an 
instrument for some countries to achieve influence over others (e.g., Buira 2005, Bird and 
Rowlands 2006). The control pursued may be political, commercial, or over the strategies to 
attain development. Furthermore, some authors claim that the influence over IFIs’ lending 
decisions is essential to guarantee the engagement of powerful countries in international 
cooperation and therefore the survival of these institutions (Dreher et al. 2009b, Copelovitch 
2010). Not surprisingly, the development aid literature recognizes that major stakeholders’ 
particular interests in borrowing countries are a key driver of resources allocated by IFIs 
(e.g., Thacker 1999, Dreher et al. 2009a, Kilby 2011).  
In a similar way, regional powers may approach Regional Development Banks 
(RDBs) to exert influence over their geographical proximity, as these might be advantageous 
in terms of participation, scope and coverage (Kilby 2006, Lim and Vreeland 2013). Saudi 
Arabia is not an exception and has taken the initiative to found and assume the chief 
sponsorship of several RDBs most likely to gain leadership in the Arab region and its 
periphery without the interference of the G7 countries.
1
 Unlike the G7, religious affiliation is 
particularly important for Saudi Arabia to draw political alliances in the Islamic world, 
making the building of common strategies for this region between both sides a difficult task 
(Neumayer 2004, Andersen et al. 2006, Clark 2012). For this reason, it is rather challenging 
for Saudi Arabia to position its interest through the Bretton Woods Institutions, despite its 
important participation in them (Blanchard and Prados 2007, Copelovitch 2010, Bremmer 
                                                          
1
 Saudi Arabia is the largest shareholder of the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development, 
the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the 
Arab Gulf Program for the United Nations Development Organizations, the Arab Monetary Fund, the Islamic 
Development Bank, and the OPEC Fund for International Development (AAAID 2012; BADEA 2012; AFESD 
1968; AGFUND 2011; AMF 2012; IsDB 2010; OFID 2012). None of the G7 countries is a member of any of these 
RDBs listed. 
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2013).
2
 In this paper we analyze the lending decisions of the Islamic Development Bank 
(IsDB), by far the largest Saudi-led RDB and Arab development agency, and observe to what 
extent they are driven by Saudi Arabia’s political interests based on religious affiliation.3 We 
further perform a similar assessment of the World Bank for the same group of countries and 
over the same time frame, and observe the relative advantage Saudi Arabia might gain by 
taking on the directorship of an RDB to pursue its own interests.   
The limited number of studies on aid allocation by Arab donors agree that 
predominantly Muslim countries are their main beneficiaries (Simmons 1981, Hunter 1984, 
Neumayer 2003, 2004). This finding can also be extended to the IsDB, as it was set up in 
1975 with the very purpose of providing development assistance only to countries affiliated 
to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and to facilitate their access to Sharia 
compliant monetary resources (Warde 2000, Villanger 2007). Though Islamic solidarity is 
expected to play a dominant role in IsDB lending decisions, Muslim communities are not 
homogeneous and recognizing a grasp of countries’ affiliation to specific Islamic 
denominations is crucial to understanding politics in the region. Saudi Arabia, as largest 
donor of the Bank, pays special attention to the different Islamic denominations in forging 
political alliances in the Islamic world and therefore we expect this to be reflected in IsDB 
lending patterns (Clark 2012, Abdo 2013). 
                                                          
2
 Saudia Arabia is the eighth, tenth and sixth largest capital subscriber in the IMF, IBRD and IDA respectively 
(IMF 2013, World Bank 2013a, World Bank 2013b).  
3
 Statistics in OFID (2004) suggest that the IsDB is the largest Saudi led and Arab development agency with 
cumulative loan commitments until 2003 of US$ 34,224 million. Same figures for the following major Arab 
development agencies are US$ 15,492 million for the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, US$ 
12,400 for the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, US$ 6,896 million for the OPEC Fund for 
International Development, US$ 6,474 million for the Saudi Fund for Economic Development, US$ 3,384 
million for the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, US$ 2,196 million for the Arab Bank for Economic 
Development in Africa, and US$ 238 million for the Arab Gulf Program for United Nations Development 
Organizations. 
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Of particular relevance to comprehending Saudi Arabian interests is the relationship 
between Sunnis and Shias, which are the first and second largest Islamic denominations and 
constitute around 95 percent of the total Muslim population (PEW Research Center 2009a, 
2009b). Sunni-Shia relations have been marked by violent conflict and tensions between 
them are a common phenomenon across the Arab region and its periphery (Luomi 2008, 
Blanchard and Prados 2007). This has resulted in the polarization of Islamic societies based 
on affiliations to these two denominations, and international political support among equal 
Islamic denominations is the norm (Clark 2012, Keath 2013). As for communities affiliated 
with smaller Islamic branches, cooperation is usually sustained on the acceptance of one or 
the other’s religious fundamentals (Luomi 2008, Clark 2012). The Sunni-Shia divide, 
however, seems to play a less relevant role in the presence of strong social frictions with non-
Islamic communities. Sunnis and Shias tend to collaborate with one another during periods of 
conflict with populations of other faiths in multi-religious countries, arguably to join together 
against a common enemy (Abdo 2013, Hunter 2013).  
Using panel data on IsDB loan commitments allocated across its 56 member countries 
during the 1976-2007 period, we find that Sunni affiliated member countries receive 
significantly more resources from the Bank relative to non-Muslim affiliated members. In 
addition, members with large Shia populations witness significantly larger loans relative to 
those with large non-Muslim populations, but this is conditional on the presence of conflicts 
with other religious groups (Christians or Hindus, for example). These lending patterns 
closely mirror the political stance of Saudi Arabia in the Islamic world. A comparable 
analysis employing World Bank loan commitments suggests that Saudi interests do not 
influence lending from this institution to the Arab region and its periphery. These findings 
confirm the advantage for Saudi Arabia to positions its interests by assuming the leadership 
of a RDB.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the IsDB, section 3 
presents our argument with anecdotal evidence on the polarization of the Islamic world and 
how it might affect lending decisions at the IsDB. Section 4 introduces our data and 
estimation strategy, while section 5 presents the discussion of our main results, and section 6 
concludes the study.  
 
2. The Islamic Development Bank 
The founding of the IsDB was in response to the interest of the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) in providing its member states with access to Sharia compliant financial 
resources. The idea was encouraged by King Faisal Bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia and first 
discussed during the Second Islamic Finance Ministers’ Conference held in Jeddah in 1974 
(Warde 2000). Headquartered in this same city, the Bank started its operations in 1975 with 
its 22 founding members, which are largely found in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region. Since then, membership has been extended to countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Central Asia, South Asia, South East Asia, and Latin America, with a total of 56 
members to date, all of which are eligible to receive loans.
4
 Affiliation with the OIC is a basic 
condition for membership in the Bank (IsDB 2013a). 
 The mission of the IsDB is to promote human development focusing on the 
alleviation of poverty, improvement of health and education standards, and assurance of good 
governance practices in accordance with the principles of the Sharia law (IsDB 1974). The 
IsDB was to become the cornerstone of Sharia compliant banking. Financial services 
delivered within this banking scheme follow three core principles: prohibition of interest rates 
on loans, share of financial risk between provider and customer, and investing solely in 
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 A complete list of the current members of the IsDB is given in Appendix 1.  
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businesses that provide goods and services in accordance with Islamic values (Gafoor 1995, 
Warde 2000). The IsDB exclusively offers financial instruments that are consistent with 
Sharia law, the most common being interest-free loans, instalment sales, leasings, and 
financial services referred as istisnaa.
5
 Interest-free loans are extended to governments to 
provide long-term financing for development projects in basic infrastructure and agriculture. 
They are free of interest rate charges, however, they do bear a service fee to cover 
administrative related expenses incurred by the Bank, which must not exceed 2.5 percent per 
annum. Softer conditions may be provided for certain types of projects in the least developed 
members, in which the administrative fee ceiling is set at 0.75 percent yearly. Even though 
service fees might resemble interest rates, these cannot be affected by time horizons of 
repayments and therefore, in case of default for example, no additional charges can be 
incurred (Warde 2000). Throughout instalment sales the Bank purchases the machinery or 
equipment needed for a certain project and then resells it to the beneficiary adding a mark-up 
mutually agreed upon by both parties, which must not exceed 5.1 percent yearly. The 
ownership of the asset is transferred to the beneficiary upon delivery. By opting for a lease, 
often denoted as ijarah, the Bank procures an asset needed for the production of a good or 
service, such as factories or power generation plants, and rents them to the beneficiary for a 
specific period of time. The assets procured remain property of the Bank during the lease 
financing period and the profit margin ceiling is 5.1 percent yearly. Lastly, istisnaa is a 
financial instrument in which the Bank produces a specific good to be manufactured from 
materials available to it, according to certain agreed specifications, to be distributed to the 
beneficiary at a determined price. Conditions regarding the rate of return and ceilings are the 
same as for instalment sales. 
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 According to the IsDB’s Financial Statement for the year 2012, these financial instruments represent the vast 
majority of the assets of the Ordinary Capital Resources (OCR) of the Bank (IsDB 2013b).    
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The IsDB’s capital comes from the contributions paid by its members. At the time of 
the foundation of the Bank, the Board of Governors determined the number of shares each 
member is entitled to subscribe to the ordinary capital. The Board of Governors must also 
make the decision concerning reestablishment of the new distribution of shares in cases 
where it has admitted an additional country to membership, authorized a general capital stock 
increase, or accepted a request to raise an existing member’s subscriptions. Currently, the 
largest shareholder of the Bank is Saudi Arabia with 23.6 percent of the total capital 
subscriptions. The next largest shareholders in order from largest to smallest are Libya, Iran, 
Nigeria, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, Turkey and Kuwait, each of them holding 
between 9 and 6 percent of the Bank’s capital subscriptions. Each of the 56 members 
appoints a governor and an alternate governor to the Board of Governors, which is the highest 
policy making body in the Bank. Governors usually hold key ministerial positions in their 
countries of origin and represent the interests of their home governments in the Bank. The 
voting power of each governor is linked to the country’s contribution to the Bank’s capital 
stock, with each having 500 votes plus one additional vote for every share subscribed. The 
Board of Governors elects the officials of the Board of Executive Directors and the president 
of the Bank. It delegates the management of the general operations of the Bank to the Board 
of Executive Directors, including budget approvals and other decisions concerning the 
business of the Bank. The Board of Executive Directors is composed of 9 permanent officials 
from the abovementioned 9 member countries and 9 additional rotating officials from the 
remaining 47 member countries. The president of the Bank is appointed for a 5 year term and 
may be reelected.  
The approval of any decision met in the Board of Governors and the Board of 
Executive Directors requires a simple majority. This gives Saudi Arabia an enormous 
advantage in every decision making process, as it owns almost half of the voting power 
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required for a resolution to be accepted. Essentially, it needs the support of only three or four 
other large member countries to pass any favored proposal. Even though Saudi Arabia does 
not retain a formal veto power, it is very difficult to approve any project it is opposed to. Its 
formal influence in the governance of the IsDB is reflected by the fact that the president has 
always been a Saudi national. In effect, Ahman Mohamed Ali Al-Madani has held the 
presidency from the foundation of the Bank to the present day (except for the period 1993 – 
1995 in which he served the Muslim World League as Secretary General), implying that he 
has been reelected seven times by the Board of Governors. The president is the chief 
executive of the Bank and acts as chairman of the Board of Executive Directors. In addition, 
he nominates the vice presidents to be elected by the previously mentioned body and is 
responsible for the appointment and dismissal of the officers and staff of the Bank. Such 
organizational structure allows the government of Saudi Arabia to substantially control the 
IsDB. 
The core business of the IsDB involves two different lines of credit financed by the 
Ordinary Capital Resources (OCR) of the Bank and the Waqf Fund respectively. Compulsory 
fees, provided by the 56 members of the Bank, form its OCR and support development 
projects in the territories of these countries. On a smaller scale, other voluntary contributions 
are delivered to the Waqf Fund to sponsor Muslim communities in non-member countries. 
These resources represent less than one fifth of the Bank’s total assets, with more than 60 
percent of the total being donated by Saudi Arabia (IsDB 2013b).
6
 On average, the IsDB 
committed US$ 400 million every year to its members during the 1976 – 2007 period (refer 
to Figure 1). Relatively generous allocations during the early years of the Bank resumed after 
                                                          
6
 Further information on other contributors of the Waqf Fund can be found at the IsDB’s website, following the 
menu on “About IDB,” “Specialized Funds,” and “AWQAF Properties Investments Funds” (www.isdb.org last 
accessed: 01.05.2014). 
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the price of oil (the largest donors’ main export commodity and source of government 
revenue) returned to its historical average during the early 1980s. Low oil prices and 
production throughout most of this same decade, as well as instability in the region caused by 
the Gulf War in the early 1990s, limited the availability of resources of the Bank until the 
mid-1990s (Shushan and Marcoux 2011). Funding has since then been on the rise and 
commitments reached US$800 million in 2007. These figures place the IsDB as the largest 
Arab development agency and donor (OFID 2004, IsDB 2010). The largest beneficiaries of 
the IsDB have been Bangladesh, which received US$ 580 million during the 1976 – 2007 
period, followed by Morocco and Senegal with around US$ 500 million each (refer to Figure 
2). Brunei, Surinam and Libya have received the lowest contributions, with a total of less 
than US$ 10 million between them during the same time frame. Electricity generation and 
transmission and transportation infrastructure have been the main priority sectors of the 
Bank: they account for 41 percent and 35 percent respectively of all resources delivered since 
the Bank’s founding (IsDB 2013b). In fact, one of the two largest loans approved by the 
IsDB, worth more than US$ 70 million, was granted to Mali in 2007 to finance the expansion 
of its power generation network. The other loan, and the largest ever granted by the IsDB, 
was delivered to Pakistan in 2006, with a value of more than US$ 80 million, for the 
reconstruction of a community affected by an earthquake. The smallest IsDB loan registered 
in the 1976 – 2007 period supported the organization of a symposium on pollution control 
held in Jordan in 2004, and the second smallest a training program in the field of energy 
generation in Turkey in 2004. The amount of each of these loans was less than US$ 15.000.  
 
3. The argument 
Political and commercial interests of donors have often been recognized as a key driver of 
resources delivered though IFIs. Regional powers may have the opportunity to gain influence 
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in countries in their vicinity through their control over strategic RDB, as these might be 
advantageous in terms of participation, scope and coverage (Kilby 2006, Lim and Vreeland 
2013). Saudi Arabia took the initiative to found and financially lead the IsDB, the first and 
largest Arab development agency in terms of monetary resources and geographical coverage, 
most likely seeking to position itself in the Arab region and its periphery. Achieving such an 
outcome through the Bretton Woods Institutions would be very difficult, despite Saudi 
Arabia being a major shareholder, as these are virtually dominated by the G7 countries. 
Fulfilling and maintaining its role as a leader in Islamic societies is a foreign policy priority 
for Saudi Arabia and it perceives itself as the principal responsible for the development, 
cooperation, and support of the region (Al-Yahya and Fustier 2011). As highlighted in the 
previous section, its substantial contribution in the establishment of the Bank allowed Saudi 
Arabia to structure it in a way that development projects it strongly opposes are rather 
difficult to be approved. Therefore, we expect the allocation of aid by the IsDB to closely 
mirror the political stance of Saudi Arabia in the Islamic world. 
 Saudi interests in the Arab region and its periphery are strongly linked with religious 
beliefs. This is a consequence attributed to the polarization of Islamic societies based on 
Islamic affiliation in which international political support among equals Islamic 
denominations is the norm (Clark 2012, Keath 2013). A vast majority of the Muslim 
population, comprising 95 percent of its total, is affiliated to either the Sunni or Shia branches 
of Islam, resulting in a fairly clear two-sided division of the Islamic world (PEW Research 
Center 2009a, 2009b). The Sunni-Shia split can be traced back to the succession dispute to 
designate the leader of the Muslim community after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 
632 AD (Clark 2012). The appointed nominees were never fully recognized by all of the 
Prophet’s disciples, instigating a division within Muslims according to who was accepted as 
their legitimate leader. These different groups would evolve into the Sunnis, who fully 
10 
 
recognize the appointed nominees, the Shiites, who partially recognized the appointed 
nominees, and the other minor braches of the Islam (Clark 2012). The foundation and 
expansion of the different caliphates throughout history have molded the configuration of the 
Islamic world along its different denominations until the present. Usually, Sunnis have held 
the power and Shiites have emerged as their opposition (Clark 2012, Abdo 2013). Today, the 
great majority of countries in the MENA region, as well as many in Central Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa, and a few in Europe, South Asia, and South East Asia, are largely Muslim 
(PEW Research Center 2009a, 2009b). Significant Muslim minorities, comprising at least 10 
percent of the total population, are to be found in numerous additional countries in these same 
regions and in Latin America, where they usually coexist with either Christians or Hindus. 
Around 80 percent of the global Muslim population is Sunni and 15 percent Shiite. Shia 
Islam represents the majority of the Muslim population in Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iran, and Iraq, 
more than a third in Kuwait, Lebanon, and Yemen, and at least 5 percent in Afghanistan, 
Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkey, United Arab 
Emirates, and other countries (PEW Research Center 2009a, 2009b). 
 Saudi Arabia, with the Salafist stream of Sunni Islam as its state religion whose 
doctrines are anti-Shiite, is on the forefront to espouse a united Sunni bloc against the “Axis 
of Resistance” led by the Shia affiliated governments of Iran, Syria, and the Shia political 
party Hezbollah in Lebanon (Clark 2012). Moreover, Saudi Arabia is believed to use 
development assistance to countries in the region to demonstrate to Shia affiliated 
governments that it is the leading nation in the Islamic world (Al-Yahya and Fustier 2011). 
The Arab Spring, ongoing since late 2010 in several countries of the MENA region, clearly 
reflects the polarization of Islamic societies between Sunnis and Shiites. As an example, the 
government of Bahrain, officially affiliated to the Sunni Islam, has received military support 
from the Jordanian and Saudi Arabian Sunni regimes to block the revolutionary wave of 
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protests backed by its Shia population (Al Jazeera 2011, Itani 2013). In contrast, the main 
actors of the Syrian civil war are, on the one side, the Syrian government, Iran and Hezbollah 
aid forces, all of them Shia affiliated, and on the other side, the Syrian opposition and militant 
groups supported by the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, all of which are linked to 
Sunni Islam (Sanger 2012, DeYoung 2012, Dehghan 2012). 
 There is plenty of evidence to suggest that Saudi Arabia favors Sunni populations in 
terms of development cooperation. Ousman (2012), for example, identifies that IsDB 
resources for education that are aimed to increase school enrolment, are preferably allocated 
within communities in which the youth follows Salafi principles associated with anti-Shiite 
tenets. Likewise, Al-Yahya and Fustier (2011) and Burke (2012) agree that the surge in Saudi 
Arabia’s development aid to Yemen in the previous decade through the IsDB and other 
agencies was in response to the escalation of the armed conflict between the Yemeni 
government, Sunni affiliated groups, and Shiite rebel groups in a region bordering the Saudi 
Kingdom. Cooper (2007) reports that in a desperate bid to keep the Hezbollah led coalition 
from obtaining power in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia allocated IsDB resources worth US$ 250 
million to the newly elected Prime Minister Fouad Siniora from the Sunni faction in 2005. Al 
Arabiya (2013) sustains that funding to Egypt from the IsDB significantly increased in 2012 
in order to strengthen the Sunni led government of Mohammed Morsi. Moreover, Deegan 
(1995) states that Saudi Arabia exerted influence over the IsDB in 1983 to pressure the 
government of Sudan to declare the country a Sunni based Islamic state in its constitution in 
return for development assistance.  
This anecdotal evidence supports the proposition that IsDB lending mirros the 
political interests of Saudi Arabia in the Islamic world; namely, Sunni countries receive 
comparatively more development assistance from the Bank. We thus hypothesize (1): being a 
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Sunni country increases the probability of receiving a higher amount of development 
aid commitments from the IsDB.        
 Internal divisions of Muslim societies, however, play a less relevant role in the 
presence of strong social frictions with non-Islamic communities. “Islamic Solidarity” 
prevails across the different branches of Islam during such periods of conflict in which 
different Islamic denominations tend to form political coalitions to confront common 
opponents in multi religious countries (Abdo 2013). The Lebanese Civil War, lasting from 
1975 to 1990, is a notable example of how Sunni and Shia populations interact together in the 
face of tensions with other religions. Lebanon is a country shared by Christians, Sunni and 
Shia Muslims, and during the Civil War both Muslim populations cooperated with each other 
to confront the common Christian adversary. Together they formed the Lebanese National 
Resistance Front, a militia seeking to overthrow the Christian-dominated government 
(Ghorbani et al. 2014). Additional evidence suggests that Saudi led development agencies 
provide assistance in response to tensions with non-Muslims. Robles (2007), for example, 
reports that the IsDB provided US$16 million to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 
rebel group, which controls the Mindanao province in the Philippines, whose population is 
largely comprised of Muslims of different denominations. The MNLF is a political 
organization founded in 1969 that promotes the independence of their region from the 
Philippines alleging that the government economically discriminates against Muslims. 
Similarly, the Royal Thai Embassy (2012) reports the funding of educational projects by the 
IsDB among Muslim communities in the province of Pattani in Thailand, in which local rebel 
groups struggle for regional autonomy. Al-Yahya and Fustier (2011) describes another 
example, indicating that the government of Saudi government makes substantial 
contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, from 
which individuals affiliated to different Islamic denominations receive assistance.  
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Therefore, “Islamic solidarity” is likely to dominate in the presence of conflict with 
other religious groups, and this leads us to the following hypothesis (2): the politics of the 
Sunni-Shia divide do not influence IsDB aid allocation decisions in the presence of 
religious tensions with non-Muslim religious communities. 
 
4. Data and Methods 
We analyze a panel dataset consisting of 56 member countries covering the years from 1976 
to 2007.
7
 Our model estimates the allocation of resources by the IsDB as a function of factors 
capturing donor and recipient characteristics. The dependent variable measures IsDB aid 
commitments to country i in period t expressed in logarithmic form  and in year 2000 
constant US dollars.
8
 Note that our panel is unbalanced given different membership dates of 
recipient countries and missing observations. From a possible maximum of 32, the average 
number of years per member country for which information on commitments is available is 
around 16, ranging from 2 (Brunei) to 29 (Senegal). To circumvent this issue, we consider 4-
year averages for our dependent variable, reducing our panel to 8 periods: 1976-1979, 1980-
1983, 1984-1987, 1988-1991, 1992-1995, 1996-1999, 2000-2003, and, 2004-2007. Under 
this structure, the average number of periods per member country is greater than 6 and for 
almost half of the recipients there is full information. Another distinguishing feature of our 
dependent variable is that is has zero observations. The clustering in this lower limit responds 
to the fact that IsDB aid commitments to certain countries for several years was simply zero. 
Analyzing such a model with an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator would violate 
several assumptions, such as zero mean errors, thereby resulting in biased estimates 
                                                          
7
 Information on IsDB commitments is at the present date publicly available until 2007. Palestinian 
Administrated Areas is an active member of the IsDB, however, it falls out the empirical analysis given the 
unavailability of data for our control variables.  
8
 A value of one is added to the dependent variable before its logarithmic transformation, in order to keep zero 
observations.  
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(Neumayer 2002, 2003). This feature makes it necessary to use a nonlinear estimation 
method; therefore we follow Beck and Katz (1995) and adopt a Tobit maximum likelihood 
estimator with heteroskedasticity consistent robust standard errors. The following equations 
are estimated: 
 
   Loanit = β0 + βRRit + βXXit + γt + εit    (1)  
Loanit = β0 + βTRit*Tit + βXXit + μi + γt + εit   (2)  
  
 Loanit is the dependent variable, Rit is a matrix containing different variables 
accounting for religion based characteristics of member country i in period t, Tit is an 
indicator measuring religious tensions, and Xit is a matrix of control variables. The intercept 
is referred to as β0, the remaining βs are the vectors of coefficients of the corresponding 
matrices, μi and γt denote country and time fixed effects respectively, and εit is the error term. 
Note that we include country fixed effects only in (2), which includes the interaction term, 
because the variables in Rit are often time invariant. The usage of two way fixed effects in (1) 
will not only be collinear with time invariant regressors but will also generate biased 
estimates with largely time invariant regressors (Beck 2001). Additionally, the coefficients in 
the β vectors cannot be interpreted directly in the nonlinear Tobit model. We thus compute 
the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on either  (    |   ), 
 (    |         ) or  (   |   ).
9
 We calculate the marginal effects at the mean of the 
respective covariates and report these in the regression output tables.
10
  
                                                          
9
 For our model yit corresponds to the dependent variable Loanit and xit for any variable in Rit, Tit or Xit.  
10
 Regarding the time dummy variables, marginal effects are calculated at a specific period rather than at the 
mean value. We take the most recent period 2004-2007 for this purpose, but the results remain similar if any 
other period is taken instead.  
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 In order to test our first hypothesis, we introduce four different discrete measures 
capturing the religion-based characteristics of recipients. The first two measures consider the 
religious affiliation of the population. Here, a variable receives the value of one if the 
majority of the population in a member country is Sunni and zero if otherwise. The other is 
one if the majority of the population in a member country is Shiite and zero otherwise. The 
baseline and omitted category receives the value of one if the majority of the population in a 
member country is non-Muslim and zero if otherwise.
11
 The information to construct these 
variables comes from the religious population statistics published by the Pew Research 
Center. Please note that during our period of analysis demographic changes based on 
religious affiliation have not been pronounced in any of the recipients, therefore none of the 
population based variables change over time. The last two measures consider the religious 
affiliation of the head of state. We decided to include this characteristic in our analysis given 
that in some countries, such as in Bahrain and Syria, the religious affiliation of the majority 
of the population and that of the head of state does not coincide. Likewise, a variable takes 
the value of one if the religious affiliation of the head of the state is Sunni and zero otherwise, 
and the other variable is one if the religious affiliation of the head of the state is Shia and zero 
otherwise. In this case, the baseline and omitted category receives the value of one if 
religious affiliation of the head of the state is different to Muslim and zero otherwise.
12
 In 
order to construct these variables, we consulted the profiles of the head of states available in 
                                                          
11
 All IsDB member countries fall exclusively into one of these three categories, except for Lebanon and Oman. 
None of Lebanon’s main population groups, Christians, Shiites and Sunnis, make up at least 50% of the total 
population. We code this country in the baseline category, or as a non-Muslim majority populated country, 
given that the largest of the three groups is by far the Christians (PEW Research Center 2009a, 2009b). Oman’s 
population is largely Ibadi affiliated, another Islam denomination. We coded it in the second category, along 
with the Shia majority populated countries, given than it is a Muslim majority populated country affiliated to a 
denomination different to that of Saudi Arabia’s. 
12
 As for the population based variables, Oman does not fall in any of these three categories. The religious 
affiliation of the head of the state is Ibadi Islam, and it is coded under the second category, along the Shia 
regime countries.   
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the CIA World Factbook and Encyclopedia Britannica. For most of the member countries, 
these variables do not change over time. In our sample, changes of regime based on religion 
are to be found in a few cases, such as in Iraq in 2003, and in Lebanon in 1988 and 1990.  
Figure 3 presents the distribution of IsDB loan commitments according to the 
religious affiliation of the recipients' populations. As can be seen, every Sunni majority 
populated member country obtained on average US$ 13 million each year from the Bank 
during the 1976-2007 period. The same figure for Shia and non-Muslim majority populated 
countries is US$ 9.8 million and US$ 8.5 million respectively. Figure 4 reports similar 
statistics taking into account the religious affiliation of the head of state. Differences between 
the three groups follow the same pattern but are less pronounced: member countries in which 
the head of state is Sunni affiliated received on average US$12.8 million every year from the 
Bank, while those in which the head is Shia and non-Muslim affiliated received US$ 10.5 
million and US$ 8.8 million respectively. These numbers reveal the expected pattern from 
our first hypothesis. The statistical significance of these categories are reported and discussed 
in next section.          
 The term Tit in (2) is included to test our second hypothesis. Here we interact a 
measurement of religious tensions with the two dummy variables signaling if a member is a 
Shia country according to its population and head of state. We take the Religious Tensions 
Index from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which takes a minimum value of 0 
for cases of highest religious tensions and a maximum value of 6 for cases of absence of 
religious tensions. The indicator only captures tensions between different religions and not 
within groups belonging to different Islamic denominations. The Index is only available since 
1985; therefore we lose the first two periods in our panel when adding the interaction term.  
 We add a second dimension in Figure 5 to present the distribution of resources. It 
shows the allocation of IsDB loan commitments considering the religious affiliation of the 
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population as well as the level of religious tensions in the recipient country. Darker bars 
denote periods of higher religious tension, or years in which the Index takes a value between 
0 and 3. Lighter bars denote for periods of lower religious tension, or years in which the 
Index takes a value between 3 and 6. As the figure shows, Sunni and non-Muslim majority 
populated countries receive fewer resources from the Bank in periods of higher religious 
tension, US$ 13 million vs. US$ 12.5 million and US$ 9 million vs. US$ 6.8 million 
respectively, on average every year and per member country over the 1985-2007 period. 
Exactly the opposite occurs in Shia majority populated countries: these receive larger IsDB 
loan commitments in periods of higher religious tension, US$ 9.7 million vs. US$ 10.4 
million on average during the same time period. Note that the greatest contrast in terms of 
religious tension is found in non-Muslim majority populated countries. Similarly, Figure 6 
presents the distribution of IsDB loan commitments according to the religious affiliation of 
the head of state and the level of religious tension. The numbers resemble that of the previous 
figure, however variation between periods of higher and lower religious tensions are less 
pronounced, in absolute as well as in percentage terms. These patterns suggest that our 
second hypothesis is not rejected and Shia member countries seem to be rewarded during 
periods of conflict with other religions. In the next section we test whether these differences 
are statistically significant.  
 We follow the literature on aid allocation by RDBs (Kilby 2006, 2011, Hernandez 
2013), Arab donors (Neumayer 2003, 2004) and other non-DAC donors (Fuchs and 
Vadlamannati 2013) in selecting our control variables. To reflect recipient needs, we include 
the total population and GDP per capita in current prices in member countries, both in log 
form. Total population is expected to be positively associated with loan commitments as this 
variable accounts for country size. The effect of GDP per capita should be negative given that 
richer countries are less likely to need aid resources to develop. Ideally, GDP per capita 
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would be given in constant prices to avoid any time trend distortions, however, employing 
such measurement would reduce our dataset considerably due to data availability. The 
inclusion of time fixed effects facilitate in greater extent to overcome this issue. We include 
measures of institutional quality and political stability in member countries to account for 
merit as a motive for the supply of aid. The first measurement is a democracy dummy 
variable taken from Cheibub et al. (2010) based on the distinction between regimes where 
executive and legislative offices are designated via elections and those where they are not. If 
elections are contested in a member country for a given year the variable takes the value of 
one in that observation, and zero otherwise.
13
 The second measure addresses the incidence of 
a civil war as found in Gleditsch et al. (2002). The dummy variable takes the value of one if 
there is an armed conflict between the state and an organized group causing at least 25 deaths 
in a single year in a member country, and zero otherwise. Moreover, we include two variables 
controlling for Saudi strategic interests in member countries, namely Saudi Arabian bilateral 
aid in constant prices and logarithmic form and merchandise trade relative to GDP. Bilateral 
aid allocation by Saudi Arabia is a proxy for its political interests, as bilateral aid is often 
regarded as a reward for political allies (Kilby 2006, 2011).
14
 Merchandise trade relative to 
GDP accounts for trade openness in recipient countries and also for commercial interests with 
members of the Bank. Merchandise trade is preferred over total trade due to data availability 
reasons. We expect these two variables to be positively correlated with IsDB loan 
commitments. Finally, we include three additional variables as loan demand factors. Obtained 
from De Soysa and Binningsbo (2012), the first of these factors is the value of oil production 
in a member country for a given year. Many of the member countries are rich in oil and the 
                                                          
13
 For more detailed description and methodology, see Cheibub et al. (2010). 
14
 As Saudi Arabia is a recipient country itself, observations for this country consist of the largest bilateral 
allocation made by Saudi Arabia in each year. The exclusion of this variable in the analysis does not affect 
results.     
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greater a country's oil production the lower the likelihood that it will be dependent on 
development assistance. The remaining two measures control for international reserves as a 
share of GDP and for debt crises following the dichotomous variable in Laeven and Valencia 
(2008). We expect these last two variables to take a negative and a positive sign respectively. 
We provide details on definitions and data sources in Appendix 2, and descriptive statistics in 
Appendix 3.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
Tables 1, 2, and 3 present our main findings. Table 1 shows the outcome from our data 
analysis for equation (1), testing for our first hypothesis. Here we introduce all variables that 
describe the religious affiliation of the population and that of the head of state described in 
section 4. Results for equation (2) including our interaction with the Religious Tensions 
Index and testing of our second hypothesis are displayed in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 presents 
this analysis based on population characteristics, while Table 3 presents it based on 
information on the head of state. All models are initially estimated using all control variables 
whereas a reduced form of the model is always shown in contiguous columns. The reduced 
form models control only for recipient needs, namely population and GDP per capita. The 
three tables report the marginal effects at the mean of the respective covariates, while 
subsequent graphs exhibit the evaluation of the marginal effects at different levels to address 
the interaction term in (2). Note that the dataset in Table 1 is one third larger than that of 
Tables 2 and 3 because the Religious Tensions Index is only available from 1985 onwards. 
Values in parentheses refer to p-values. 
 Column 1 in Table 1 reports results from the regression adding the Sunni and Shia 
majority population variables, taking non-Muslim populated countries as a baseline category. 
Column 3 contains the Sunni and Shia regime variables, taking non-Muslim regime countries 
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as a baseline category. Population and head of state characteristics are included in separate 
specifications because of the high level of correlation between them.
15
 As can be seen in 
column 1, both Sunni and Shia majority populated countries receive significantly more 
resources, at conventional levels, from the IsDB than non-Muslim majority populated 
countries. The interpretation of the marginal effects reveals that being a Sunni majority 
populated country increases the flow of resources from the Bank by 69 percent, relative to 
non-Muslim majority populated, while this same figure for the counterpart is 126 percent. A 
Wald test comparing their means confirms, however, that these are not statistically 
significantly different.
16
 Column 3 indicates that the IsDB allocates significantly larger loans 
to Sunni regime countries, at the 5 percent level, relative to non-Muslim regime countries, but 
not to Shia regime countries at conventional significance levels. In fact, the marginal effects 
suggest that countries in which the head of state is affiliated to the Sunni branch of Islam 
obtain on average 78 percent larger commitments relative to those not affiliated to any 
Islamic denomination. Results remain stable in terms of sign, size, and significance levels 
when employing the reduced form, as shown in columns 2 and 4. It is important to note that 
population and GDP per capita, in the complete and reduced forms respectively, are the only 
significant control variables at conventional levels, both taking the expected sign. These 
initial findings lend support to our first hypothesis that the IsDB favors member countries 
whose heads of state are Sunni Islam affiliated. Population characteristics show, however, 
that both Sunni and Shia countries are favored relative to the non-Muslim. The following 
analysis reveals to what extent these results are conditional on religious tensions.    
                                                          
15
 Correlation between the Sunni majority population and Sunni regime dummy variables is higher than 0.7, 
and higher than 0.5 between the Shia majority population and Shia regime dummy variables.   
16
 The Wald test implemented evaluates the null hypothesis H0: β1 = β2. The F-statistic obtained in the test is 
equal to 0.78 with a corresponding p-value of 0.38.  
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 Data analysis for equation (2), in which the Shia majority population dummy is 
interacted with the Religious Tensions Index, is presented in Table 2. The models in columns 
1 and 2 exclude country fixed effects, while those in columns 3 and 4 include them. The table 
displays marginal effects. Figures in the Shia population (dummy) row show the marginal 
effects of the Shia majority population variable evaluated at the mean value of the Religious 
Tensions Index in different model specifications. The Sunni majority population variable 
remains significant at the 1 percent level for both models without country fixed effects, and is 
significant at the 10 percent level for the reduced form model with country fixed effects. It is 
highly likely that the lower p-values for this variable in both models including country fixed 
effects are a consequence of this being time invariant. Similarly, the Shia majority population 
variable is significant at the 5 percent significance level across all specifications, except in 
one. As noted earlier, here the marginal effect is evaluated at the mean value of the Index. 
The Religious Tensions Index enters all regressions with a negative sign, but fails to be 
significant at conventional levels throughout. The direction and relevance of the interaction 
term in equation (2) is exhibited in Figures 7 and 8. Here we evaluate the marginal effect of 
the Shia majority population variable at different points along the range of the Religious 
Tensions Index.
17
 Figure 7 refers to the model excluding country fixed effects in column 1 
and Figure 8 to that including them in column 3. The continues lines correspond to average 
values for every point while dashed lines project 90 percent confidence interval boundaries. 
As can be seen in Figure 7, the marginal effect of the Shia majority population variable on 
IsDB loan commitments is positive and significant at conventional levels only for lower 
values of the Religious Tensions Index (i.e. for higher levels of religious tensions). The 
                                                          
17
 When the model is nonlinear, as in the case here, the interaction effect cannot be evaluated simply by 
looking at the sign, magnitude, or statistical significance of the coefficient on the interaction term. Instead, the 
interaction effect requires computing the marginal effects of the first variable in the interaction term 
evaluated at different points of the other variable in the interaction term (Ai and Norton 2003).   
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marginal effect turns out to be insignificant at conventional levels after the Index takes a 
value of around 4. Figure 8 confirms that this effect is robust after controlling for country 
fixed effects, but only until an Index level of around 2.5, as the marginal effects of the Shia 
population dummy variable remain significant at conventional levels just until this point. A 
little less than 25 percent of all observations in our data set fall between levels of 0 and 2.5 in 
the Index. The effect of the interaction term remains similar in terms of size and significance 
levels when employing the reduced form model in columns 2 and 4.
18
 This empirical 
evidence supports our second hypothesis: Shia majority populated member countries, relative 
to non-Muslim countries, receive more IsDB resources only when they experience high levels 
of religious tensions with other non-Muslim religious groups.  
Results for equation (2), including information on the religious affiliation of the head 
of state in member countries, are presented in Table 3. Similarly to the previous analysis, the 
table reports marginal effects, columns 1 and 2 present specifications excluding country fixed 
effects, while columns 3 and 4 including them. The Shia regime variable is interacted with 
the Religious Tensions Index in all model specifications. Figures in the Shia regime (dummy) 
row correspond to the marginal effect evaluated at the mean value of the Religious Tensions 
Index. As observed in the table, a major difference between this table and the analysis on 
population characteristics is that the Shia regime variable fails to be significant at 
conventional levels in all model specifications but one. Figures 9 and 10, depicting the 
marginal effect of the Shia regime variable at different levels of the Religious Tensions 
Index, reveal another difference. As can be seen on Figure 9, the effect of the Shia regime 
variable is only significant at conventional levels for a short range of the Index in the model 
excluding fixed effects. This is, however, not robust to the addition of fixed effects, as shown 
                                                          
18
 For simplicity, these results are not shown and are available upon request.  
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in Figure 10. These results hold with the reduced form model. Interestingly, even when 
religious tensions are present, those countries with a Shia affiliated head of state do not obtain 
larger loans from the IsDB than non-Muslim countries. Our second hypothesis is therefore 
rejected when taking into account the profile of the head of state in member countries. Thus, 
it is never advantageous in terms of IsDB allocation to be a Shia regime. Religious tensions 
between Shiites and non-Muslims seem to be a concern for the IsDB when the population of 
a member country is largely Shia, but not when its head of state is Shia affiliated. 
We replicate our models reported in Tables 1 to 3 with an OLS estimator and relax 
some assumptions in our dataset. Our main findings are not altered when implementing the 
regression with OLS in every case, suggesting that our results are robust to the choice of 
model specification. Moreover, we use different combinations of the set of control variables. 
Leaving recipient needs as fixed controls, we first include merit-based variables, then Saudi 
Arabian interests, and finally loan demand factors separately. We observe that the effect of 
our key explanatory variables remain unchanged, therefore our analysis is robust to the 
selection of control variables. Due to brevity, we do not report these last two robustness tests, 
but they are available upon request. 
In order to identify the relative advantage for Saudi Arabia to exert influence in its 
vicinity based on religious affinity through the IsDB compared to the World Bank, we 
replace our dependent variable with aid commitments from the latter organization. If the 
previously identified politics of the Sunni-Shia divide are inherent to the Saudi led financial 
institution, then the World Bank’s aid commitments must not be influenced by any of our 
main variables of interest. Using exactly the same model setting, we regress World Bank aid 
commitments, expressed in logarithmic form and in year 2000 constant US dollars, against 
our variables of interest. We analyze, as before, allocations to the 56 member countries over 
the 1976-2007 period, employing 4 year averages. The results are reported in Table 4. 
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Columns 1 and 3 refer to data analysis for equation (1), while columns 2 and 4 refer to 
equation (2) after adding the Religious Tensions Index. In order to keep this analysis as short 
as possible, the four model specifications include all control variables and exclude country 
fixed effects. The table shows marginal effects at the mean of the respective covariates. As in 
the previous analysis, the figures for the Shia majority population variable in column 2 and 
the Shia regime variable in column 4 exhibit their marginal effect on World Bank aid 
commitments evaluated at the mean value of the Religious Tension Index. As can be seen in 
the table, none of our variables capturing population and head of state characteristics 
according to religious belief are significant at conventional levels. Even the population based 
variables enter the equations with a negative sign, as shown on columns 1 and 2. The 
Religious Tensions Index fails to be significant at conventional levels as well. The marginal 
effects of the Shia majority population and Shia regime dummies are not significant at the 
mean value of the Religious Tensions Index, as seen in the table, or when evaluated at any 
point along the Index. The latter results are not shown for simplicity, but are available upon 
request. Interestingly, besides Population and GDP per capita, unlike for the IsDB, other 
control variables turn out to be significant at conventional levels. Particularly relevant is the 
incidence of civil war, which is significant at least at the 5 percent level across all 
regressions. These findings suggest that World Bank lending patterns do not reflect 
religiously-motivated political dynamics in the Arab region and its periphery, and support our 
hypothesis that these are inherent to the IsDB due to the dominance of Saudi Arabia in its 
organization.  
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6. Conclusions 
The ability of major global players to control IFIs has been suggested to ensure their 
engagement in international cooperation as well as the survival of these organizations. An 
affordable alternative for regional powers to exert influence over their vicinity is to assume 
the leadership of an RDB in contrast to strengthening its participation in a global IFI. In this 
paper we find evidence of the advantages Saudi Arabia might meet in this respect to position 
its interests in the Arab region and its periphery. In particular, we observe that Saudi Arabia 
uses the IsDB to achieve regional hegemony founded on religious affinity. We also find that 
it does not achieve the same ends with its participation in the World Bank, where it is 
arguably challenging to coordinate common strategies with other large shareholders for 
whom religion is not essential for political alliances.  
 The analysis of aid allocation by the IsDB to its 56 members during the 1976-2007 
period reveals a bias towards Sunni countries, and towards Shia countries in exceptional 
occasions, while non-Muslim countries are the least favored. These lending patterns closely 
mirror the political stance of Saudi Arabia in the Islamic world. Specifically, the IsDB 
delivers on average 78 percent more resources to member countries in which the head of state 
is Sunni affiliated. Member countries with Shia majority populations experience significant 
increases in lending from the Bank only when religious tensions with non-Muslim 
communities are high. Interestingly, along with country size, religious affiliation is the core 
driver of IsDB aid commitments. In contrast, World Bank allocation decisions are not 
influenced by the religious characteristics of the same group of recipient countries during the 
same time frame: merit and loan demand factors explain its lending. We thereby recognize 
the incentives for Saudi Arabia to found and financially lead a RDB in its region of influence.  
 Lending patterns of IFIs are a result of the interplay of influences of a handful of large 
shareholders. Saudi Arabia pursues its political agenda in the Islamic world without the 
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intervention of G7 countries through the IsDB, creating a set of advantaged and 
disadvantaged member countries within the institution. Despite being the third largest 
shareholder of the Bank, Iran belongs to the latter group and its interests are probably 
underrepresented in allocation decisions. Not surprisingly, Iran together with two other 
countries in the region, founded in 1985 the Economic Cooperation Organization, an IFI 
serving eleven countries which are also members of the IsDB. Since then, its operations have 
been expanding in terms or resources and membership. The development aid activity will 
very likely witness the proliferation of specialized development agencies under the control of 
rising developing countries in the near future. This trend will only cease with the willingness 
of powerful countries to democratize IFIs.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
References 
AAAID (2012). Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development Annual Report 
2012. AAAID. Khartoum, Sudan.  
 
Abdo, G. (2013). The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Sunni – 
Shia Devide. The Saban Center of Middle East Policy at Brookings Analysis Paper No. 
29/2013. 
 
AFESD (1968). The Agreement Establishing the Arab Fund for Economic and Social 
Development. AFESD. Cairo, Egypt.  
 
AGFUND (2011). Arab Gulf Programme for Development Annual Report 2011. AGFUND. 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 
 
Ai, C., Norton, E. (2003). Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Models, Economics Letters, 
80: 123-129. 
 
Al-Yahya, K., Fustier, N. (2011). Saudi Arabia as a Humanitarian Donor: High Potential, 
Little Institutionalization. Global Public Policy Institute Berlin Research Paper No. 14. 
 
Al Arabiya (2013). Egyptian President Mursi and Saudi King Abdullah discuss regional 
stability. Al Arabiya. Retrieved from: 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/07/11/225853.html (last accessed: 01.06.2014). 
 
Al Jazeera (2011). Saudi Soldiers Sent into Bahrain. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/2011314124928850647.html (last 
accessed: 01.06.2014). 
 
AMF (2012). Arab Monetary Fund Annual Report 2012. AMF. Abu Dhabi, United Arab 
Emirates. 
 
Andersen, T., Hansen, H., Markussen, T. (2006). US Politics and World Bank IDA Lending. 
Journal of Development Studies 42: 772–794. 
 
BADEA (2012). Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa Annual Report 2012. 
BADEA. Karthoum, Sudan.  
 
Beck, N. (2001). Time-series Cross-section Data: What Have We Learned in the Past Few 
Years? Annual Review of Political Science 4: 271-293. 
 
Beck, N., Katz, J. (1995). What to Do (and Not to Do) With Time-series Cross-section Data. 
American Politcal Science Review 89(3): 634-647.  
 
Bird, G., Rowlands, D. (2006). IMF Quotas: Constructing an International Organization 
Using Inferior Building Blocks. The Review of International Organizations 1(2): 153-171. 
 
Blanchard, C., Prados, A. (2007) Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and US Relations, CRS Report 
for Congress Order Code RL33533. 
28 
 
 
Bremmer, I. (2013). Why Saudi Arabia and the US Do Not See Eye to Eye in the Middle 
East. Reuters. Retrieved from:  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/30/bremmer-saudi-idUSL2N0K90PD20131230 (last 
accessed: 01.06.2014) 
 
Buira, A. (2005). The Bretton Woods Institutions: Governance without Legitimacy? In: Ariel 
Buira (Eds) Reforming the Governance of the IMF and the World Bank: 7-44. Anthem Press. 
London, United Kingdom.  
 
Burke, E. (2012). One Blood and One Destiny? Yemen’s relations with the Gulf Cooperation 
Council. The London School of Economics and Political Science Research Paper No. 
23/2012.  
 
Cheibub, J., Gandhi, J., Vreeland, J. (2010) Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited, Public 
Choice 143(1-2): 67-101. 
 
CIA (2013) World Fact Book. CIA. Washington, D.C., United States.   
 
Clark, M. (2012). Haunted by History – The Power Politics of the Sunni-Shia Divide. Popular 
Social Science Fall 2012. Retrieved from:  
http://www.popularsocialscience.com/2012/11/21/haunted-by-history-how-the-sunni-shia-
divide-has-increasingly-come-to-determine-the-power-politics-of-the-middle-east/ (last 
accessed: 01.06.2014).  
 
Cooper, H. (2007). Donors Pledge $7.6 Billion in Aid for Lebanon. The New York Times. 
Retrieved from from:  
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/25/world/africa/25iht-beirut.4345204.html?_r=0 (last 
accessed 01.06.2014).  
 
Copelovitch, M. (2010). Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of 
IMF Lending. International Studies Quarterly 54: 49-77. 
Deegan, H. (1995). Contemporary Islamic influences in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Alternative 
Development Agenda. In: Eric Watkins (Eds) Middle Eastern Environment. Saint Malo press. 
Manitoba, Canada. 
 
Dehghan, S. (2012). Syrian Army Being Aided by Iranian Forces. The Guardian. Retrieved 
from: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/28/syria-army-iran-forces (last accessed: 
01.06.2014). 
 
DeYoung, K. (2012). Saudi, Qatari Plans to Arm Syrian Rebels Risk Overtaking Cautious 
Aapproach Favored by U.S. The Washington Post, Retrieved from:  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/saudi-qatari-plans-to-arm-syrian-
rebels-risk-overtaking-cautious-approach-favored-byus/2012/03/01/gIQArWQflR_story.html 
(last accessed: 01.06.2014).  
 
29 
 
De Soysa, I., H., Binningsbo (2012). Is the Devil's Excrement Social Cement? 
Energy Resources and Political Terror, 1981–2004. International Social Science Journal 
57(1): 21–32.  
Dreher, A., Sturm, J., Vreeland, J. (2009a). Global Horse Trading: IMF Loans for Votes in 
the UNSC. European Economic Review 53(7): 742-757. 
 
Dreher, A., Sturm, J., Vreeland, J. (2009b). Development Aid and International Politics: Does 
Membership on the UNSC Influence World Bank Decisions? Journal of Development 
Economics 88: 1-18. 
 
Encyclopedia Britannica (2012). Encyclopedia Britannica Academic Edition.  
Fuchs, A., Vadlamannati, K. (2013) The Needy Donor: An Empirical Analysis of India’s Aid 
Motives. World Development, 44, 110-128. 
Gafoor, A. (1995). Interest-Free Commercial Banking. APPTEC Publications.  
 
Gleditsch N. P., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M., and Havard S., (2002). Armed 
Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset. Journal of Peace Research, 39(5): 615–637. 
 
Ghorbani, A., Assoulin, Y., Al Zahrani, Schada. (2014). The Syrian War, Saudi Arabia’s 
Struggle for Global Influence, and Control of Africa. Elombah, Retrieved from: 
http://www.elombah.com/index.php/special-reports/21954-the-syrian-war-saudi-arabia-s-
struggle-for-global-influence-and-control-of-africa (last accessed 01.06.2014).  
 
Hunter, S. (1984). OPEC and the Third World. Croom Helm. London, United Kingdom. 
 
Hunter, S. (2013). The Regional and International Politics of Rising Sectarian Tensions in the 
Middle East & South Asia. Georgetown University ACMCU Occasional Papers Series. 
 
IMF (2013). IMF’s Members Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors. IMF. 
Washington, D.C. United States.   
 
ICRG (2012). International Country Risk Guide Researcher Dataset. The PRS Group. East 
Syracuse, NY, United States.  
 
IsDB (1974). Articles of Agreement. IsDB. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.  
 
IsDB (2010). Islamic Development Bank Annual Report 2010. IsDB. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 
 
IsDB (2013a). Islamic Development Bank Group in Brief. IsDB. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 
 
IsDB (2013b). Islamic Development Bank Annual Report 2012. IsDB. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 
 
IsDB (2013c). Thirty Nine Years in the Service of Development. IsDB. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 
 
Itani, F. (2013). The Promise and Perils of Gulf Aid. Atlanic Council. Retrieved from:  
30 
 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-promise-and-perils-of-gulf-aid (last 
accessed: 01.06.2014). 
 
Keath, L. (2013). Hatred between Sunnis, Shiites Abounds in Mideast. Associated Press. 
Retrieved from:  
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2013/Hatred-between-Sunnis--Shiites-abounds-in-
Mideast/id-3f07728a9d3844fe9384c481f0edbd28  (last accessed 01.06.2014).  
 
Kilby, C. (2006) Donor Influence in Multilateral Development Banks:  The Case of the Asian 
Development Bank.” Review of International Organizations, 1(2): 173-195. 
 
Kilby, C. (2011). Informal Influence in the Asian Development Bank. Review of 
International Organizations 6(3-4): 223-257. 
 
Laeven, L., Valencia, F. (2008). Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database. IMF Working 
Paper WP/08/224.  
 
Lim, D., Vreeland, J. (2013). Regional Organizations and International Politics: Japanese 
Influence over the Asian Development Bank and the UN Security Council. World Politics 
65(1): 34-72. 
 
Luomi, M. (2008). Sectarian Identities or Geopolitics? The Regional Sunni – Shia Divide in 
the Middle East. The Finish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers 56/2008. 
 
Mertz, P. (1983). Arab Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. Westview Press. New York. 
 
Neumayer, E. (2002). Is Good Governance Rewarded? A Cross-National Analysis of Debt 
Forgiveness, World Development, 30(6): 913-930. 
 
Neumayer, E. (2003). What factors determine the allocation of aid by Arab countries and 
multilateral agencies? The Journal of Development Studies, 39(4): 134-147. 
 
Neumayer, E. (2004). Arab-related Bilateral and Multilateral Sources of Development 
Finance: Issues, Trends, and the Way Forward. World Economy 27(2): 281-300. 
 
OECD (2012). International Development Statistics Online Databases on Aid and other 
Resource Flows. OECD. Paris, France. 
 
OFID (2004). Arab National and Regional Development Institutions 2004: A Profile. OFID. 
Kuwait City, Kuwait.  
 
OFID (2012). OPEC Fund for International Development Annual Report 2012. OFID. 
Kuwait City, Kuwait. 
 
Ousman, A. (2012). The power of radical Islamist ideas in fragile states in parts of sub-
Saharan Africa. OECD Development Cooperation Working Papers WP 7/2012. 
 
31 
 
PEW Research Center (2009a). Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the 
Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population. Pew Research Center. Washington, 
D.C., United States.    
 
PEW Research Center (2009b). The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 
2010-2030. Pew Research Center. Washington, D.C., United States.    
 
Rajan, R., Subramanian, A. (2008). Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence 
Really Show? The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(4): 643-665 
 
Robles, R. (2007). Islamic Bank gives US$ 16 million to Mindanao Rebel Group. South 
China Morning Post. Retrieved from:  
http://www.scmp.com/article/615505/islamic-bank-gives-us16m-mindanao-rebel-group (last 
accessed: 01.06.2014).  
 
Royal Embassy of Thailand (2012). Thai Saudi Ties. Royal Embassy of Thailand. Retrieved 
from:  
http://www.thaiembassy.org/riyadh/en/organize/29024-Thai---Saudi-Ties.html (last accessed: 
01.06.2014). 
 
Sanger, D. (2012). Rebel Arms Flow Is Said to Benefit Jihadists in Syria. The New York 
Times. Retrieved from:  
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/world/middleeast/jihadists-receiving-most-arms-sent-to-
syrian-rebels.html?_r=0 (last accessed: 01.06.2014).    
 
Simmons, A. (1981). Arab Foreign Aid. Associated University Press. London, United 
Kingdom. 
 
Shushan, D., Marcoux, C. (2011). The Rise (and Decline?) of Arab Aid: Generosity and 
Allocation in the Oil Era. World Development 39(11): 1969-1980. 
 
Thacker, S. (1999). The High Politics of IMF Lending. World Politics 52: 38-75. 
 
Villanger, E. (2007). Arab Foreign Aid: Disbursement Patterns, Aid Policies and Motives, 
Chr. Michelsen Institute Report 2/2007. 
 
Warde, I. (2000). Islamic Finance in the Global Economy. Edinburgh University Press. 
Edinburgh, United Kingdom.  
 
World Bank (2012) World Development Indicators Database. Available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (last accessed 
01.06.2014).  
 
World Bank (2013a) International Bank for Construction and Development Subscriptions and 
Voting Power of Member Countries. World Bank. Washington, D.C., United States.  
 
World Bank (2013b) International Development Association Voting Power of Member 
Countries. World Bank. Washington, D.C., United States. 
 
32 
 
Figure 1: IsDB Commitments by Year (Millions of 2000 Constant US Dollars) 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows loan commitments approved by the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) in each year for 
the 1976-2007 period. Figures are given in millions of constant US dollars (base year 2000). Source: IsDB, 
OECD. 
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Figure 2: IsDB Commitments by Borrowing Member, Total Amount in 1976-2007 
(Millions of 2000 Constant US Dollars) 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows loan commitments approved by the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) to each 
borrowing member over the period 1976-2007. Figures are given in millions of constant US dollars (base year 
2000). Source: IsDB, OECD. 
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Figure 3: IsDB Commitments by Religious Affiliation of Population, Yearly Average in 
1976-2007 (Millions of 2000 Constant US Dollars) 
 
 
Notes: “Sunni Population” identifies borrowing members where at least 50% of the population is affiliated to 
Sunni Islam, “Shia Population” identifies borrowing members where at least 50% of the population is affiliated 
to Shia Islam or any other Islam denomination different to Sunni Islam, and “Other Population” identifies 
borrowing members where at least 50% of the population is affiliated to a religion other than Islam. Figures are 
given in millions of constant US dollars (base year 2000). Source: IsDB, OECD, Pew Research Center. 
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Figure 4: IsDB Commitments by Religious Affiliation of Head of State, Yearly Average 
in 1976-2007 (Millions of 2000 Constant US Dollars) 
 
 
Notes: “Sunni Regime” identifies borrowing members whose head of state is affiliated to Sunni Islam, “Shia 
Population” identifies borrowing members whose head of state is affiliated to Shia Islam or any other Islam 
denomination different to Sunni Islam, and “Other Population” identifies borrowing members whose head of 
state is affiliated to a religion other than Islam. Figures are given in millions of constant US dollars (base year 
2000). Source: IsDB, OECD, CIA World Fact Book, Encyclopedia Britannica. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
5
1
0
1
5
Sunni Regime Shia Regime Other Regime
36 
 
Figure 5: IsDB Commitments by Religious Affiliation of Population and Religious 
Tensions, Yearly Average in 1985-2007 (Millions of 2000 Constant US Dollars) 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows loan commitments approved by the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) to each 
borrowing member whose population is of a certain religious affiliation and confronting a determined level of 
religious tensions, on average every year over the period 1976-2007. “Sunni Population” identifies borrowing 
members where at least 50% of the population is affiliated to Sunni Islam, “Shia Population” identifies 
borrowing members where at least 50% of the population is affiliated to Shia Islam or any other Islam 
denomination different to Sunni Islam, and “Other Population” identifies borrowing members where at least 
50% of the population is affiliated to a religion different to Islam. Dark bars denote for borrowing members 
experiencing high religious tensions in a given year (Religious Tensions Index between 0 and 3), light bars 
denote for borrowing members experiencing low religious tensions in a given year (Religious Tensions Index 
between 3 and 6). Figures are given in millions of constant US dollars (base year 2000). Source: IsDB, OECD, 
Pew Research Center, ICRG. 
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Figure 6: IsDB Commitments by Religious Affiliation of Head of State and Religious 
Tensions, Yearly Average in 1985-2007 (Millions of 2000 Constant US Dollars) 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows loan commitments approved by the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) to each 
borrowing member whose head of state is of a certain religious affiliation and confronting a determined level of 
religious tensions, on average every year over the period 1976-2007. “Sunni Regime” identifies borrowing 
members in which the head of stat is affiliated to Sunni Islam, “Shia Regime” identifies borrowing members in 
which the head of state is affiliated to Shia Islam or any other Islam denomination different to Sunni Islam, and 
“Other Population” identifies borrowing members in which the head of the state is affiliated to a religion 
different to Islam. Dark bars denote for borrowing members experiencing high religious tensions in a given year 
(Religious Tensions Index between 0 and 3), light bars denote for borrowing members experiencing low 
religious tensions in a given year (Religious Tensions Index between 3 and 6). Figures are given in millions of 
constant US dollars (base year 2000). Source: IsDB, OECD, Pew Research Center, ICRG. 
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Table 1: IsDB Commitments and Religious affiliation of Population and Head of State, 
Tobit (1976-2007) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Population (log) 0.244*** 0.163*** 0.223*** 0.165*** 
 
(0.0053) (0.0010) (0.0098) (0.0008) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.0959 -0.172** -0.118 -0.163** 
 
(0.4028) (0.0303) (0.2988) (0.0303) 
Democracy (dummy) -0.256 
 
-0.268 
 
 
(0.3541) 
 
(0.3364) 
 Civil war (dummy) 0.0227 
 
0.0585 
 
 
(0.9031) 
 
(0.7451) 
 Saudi Arabia aid (log) -0.00643 
 
-0.00973 
 
 
(0.7298) 
 
(0.6053) 
 Trade to GDP 0.00284 
 
0.00376 
 
 
(0.3986) 
 
(0.2669) 
 Oil production (log) -0.0162 
 
-0.0109 
 
 
(0.1929) 
 
(0.4002) 
 Int. Reserves to GDP -0.00914 
 
-0.0112 
 
 
(0.2248) 
 
(0.1233) 
 Debt crisis (dummy) 0.246 
 
0.203 
 
 
(0.7925) 
 
(0.8269) 
 Sunni population (dummy) 0.523** 0.538** 
  
 
(0.0247) (0.0169) 
  Shia population (dummy) 0.816* 0.714* 
  
 
(0.0548) (0.0562) 
  Sunni regime (dummy) 
  
0.584** 0.541** 
   
(0.0164) (0.0262) 
Shia regime (dummy) 
  
0.536 0.472 
  
  
(0.1255) (0.1494) 
Observations 306 327 306 327 
Country fixed effects No No No No 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is the loan commitments approved by the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) to 
borrowing member i in period t, denominated in constant US dollars (base year 2000) and in logarithmic scale. 
Marginal effects at the mean value of the variable are reported. Standard errors are robust. P-values are shown in 
parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 2: IsDB Commitments, Religious Affiliation of Population and Religious 
Tensions, Tobit (1976-2007) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Population (log) 0.221* 0.0899 2.068 2.354 
 
(0.0839) (0.2644) (0.2227) (0.1409) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.132 -0.269*** -0.308 -0.561* 
 
(0.3625) (0.0019) (0.3796) (0.0786) 
Democracy (dummy) -0.326 
 
0.363 
 
 
(0.3134) 
 
(0.1898) 
 Civil war (dummy) -0.0273 
 
-0.128 
 
 
(0.9205) 
 
(0.6536) 
 Saudi Arabia aid (log) -0.00871 
 
0.0240 
 
 
(0.7150) 
 
(0.2803) 
 Trade to GDP 0.000694 
 
0.0128 
 
 
(0.8656) 
 
(0.1828) 
 Oil production (log) -0.0269 
 
0.00891 
 
 
(0.1405) 
 
(0.7009) 
 Int. Reserves to GDP -0.00659 
 
0.00412 
 
 
(0.4212) 
 
(0.6583) 
 Debt crisis (dummy) 1.259 
 
-0.684 
 
 
(0.4063) 
 
(0.6863) 
 Sunni population (dummy) 0.905*** 0.882*** 0.279 1.409* 
 
(0.0020) (0.0014) (0.7785) (0.0848) 
Shia population (dummy) 1.533*** 1.036** 5.130 7.676** 
 
(0.0040) (0.0156) (0.1947) (0.0373) 
Religious Tensions -0.0497 -0.0146 -0.0680 -0.0681 
  (0.5839) (0.8509) (0.5659) (0.5480) 
Observations 207 215 207 215 
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is the loan commitments approved by the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) to 
borrowing member i in period t, denominated in constant US dollars (base year 2000) and in logarithmic scale. 
Specifications 3 and 4 control for country fixed effects. Marginal effects at the mean value of the variable are 
reported. Shia population (dummy) is interacted with Religious Tensions. Marginal effect of Shia population 
(dummy) at the mean value of Religious Tensions is reported. Standard errors are robust. P-values are shown in 
parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 3: IsDB Commitments, Religious Affiliation of Head of State and Religious 
Tensions, Tobit (1976-2007) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Population (log) 0.168 0.111 2.084 2.633 
 
(0.1743) (0.1533) (0.2189) (0.1068) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.214 -0.264*** -0.127 -0.251 
 
(0.1825) (0.0016) (0.7481) (0.5283) 
Democracy (dummy) -0.375 
 
0.428 
 
 
(0.2594) 
 
(0.1275) 
 Civil war (dummy) 0.149 
 
-0.0447 
 
 
(0.5608) 
 
(0.8822) 
 Saudi Arabia aid (log) -0.0116 
 
0.0339 
 
 
(0.6310) 
 
(0.1623) 
 Trade to GDP 0.00419 
 
0.0129 
 
 
(0.3156) 
 
(0.2070) 
 Oil production (log) -0.0161 
 
0.0163 
 
 
(0.4255) 
 
(0.4943) 
 Int. Reserves to GDP -0.0114 
 
0.00266 
 
 
(0.1727) 
 
(0.8290) 
 Debt crisis (dummy) 0.876 
 
-0.859 
 
 
(0.5794) 
 
(0.6095) 
 Sunni regime (dummy) 1.041*** 0.929*** -0.783 -1.391 
 
(0.0011) (0.0033) (0.7907) (0.4326) 
Shia regime (dummy) 0.769 0.811** 2.495 1.890 
 
(0.1328) (0.0471) (0.4674) (0.4101) 
Religious Tensions 0.0383 0.0250 0.0342 0.0277 
  (0.6793) (0.7471) (0.7897) (0.8238) 
Observations 207 215 207 215 
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is the loan commitments approved by the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) to 
borrowing member i in period t, denominated in constant US dollars (base year 2000) and in logarithmic scale. 
Specifications 3 and 4 control for country fixed effects. Marginal effects at the mean value of the variable are 
reported. Shia regime (dummy) is interacted with Religious Tensions. The marginal effect of Shia regime 
(dummy) at the mean value of Religious Tensions is reported. Standard errors are robust. P-values are shown in 
parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 4: World Bank Commitments, Religious Affiliation of Population and  
Head of State, Tobit, (1976-2007) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Population (log) 2.587*** 3.342*** 2.627*** 3.389*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
GDP per capita (log) -2.808*** -2.050*** -2.896*** -2.029** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0037) (0.0000) (0.0110) 
Democracy (dummy) 1.173 1.809 1.264 1.816 
 
(0.2165) (0.1089) (0.1867) (0.1150) 
Civil war (dummy) -4.631*** -3.145** -5.062*** -3.270** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0293) (0.0000) (0.0265) 
Saudi Arabia aid (log) 0.277** 0.206 0.282** 0.200 
 
(0.0143) (0.1688) (0.0138) (0.1880) 
Trade to GDP -0.0172 -0.0441* -0.0210 -0.0473* 
 
(0.3254) (0.0766) (0.2223) (0.0500) 
Oil production (log) -0.0845 -0.131 -0.0915 -0.146 
 
(0.1657) (0.1342) (0.1669) (0.1491) 
Int. Reserves to GDP -0.0791** -0.0487 -0.0832** -0.0490 
 
(0.0176) (0.2339) (0.0165) (0.2391) 
Debt crisis (dummy) 7.976* 10.16 8.850** 11.79 
 
(0.0701) (0.1788) (0.0461) (0.1198) 
Sunni pop. (dummy) -0.0711 -0.627 
  
 
(0.9293) (0.5704) 
  Shia pop. (dummy) -3.095 -2.126 
  
 
(0.1466) (0.8783) 
  Sunni reg. (dummy) 
  
0.419 0.185 
   
(0.6059) (0.8807) 
Shia reg. (dummy) 
  
-0.437 7.448 
   
(0.8134) (0.4772) 
Rel. Tensions 
 
0.778* 
 
0.883** 
    (0.0737) 
 
(0.0482) 
Observations 359 236 359 236 
Country fixed effects No No No No 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is the loan commitments approved by the World Bank to borrowing member i in 
period t, denominated in constant US dollars (base year 2000) and in logarithmic scale. Marginal effects at mean 
value of the variable are reported. Shia population (dummy) and Shia regime (dummy) are interacted with 
Religious Tensions in specifications (2) and (4) respectively. In these cases, the marginal effect of Shia 
population (dummy) and Shia regime (dummy) at the mean value of Religious Tensions is reported. Standard 
errors are robust. P-values are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Figure 7: Conditional Marginal Effects of Shia Population on IsDB Commitments, 
Country Fixed Effects Excluded, 90% Confidence Interval. 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows the marginal effects of Shia population (dummy) on IsDB loan commitments (log). 
Marginal effects are conditioned to different values of Religious Tensions. Dashed lines denote the upper and 
lower boundaries of the 90% confidence interval. 
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Figure 8: Conditional Marginal Effects of Shia Population on IsDB Commitments, 
Country Fixed Effects Included, 90% Confidence Interval 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows the marginal effects of Shia population (dummy) on IsDB loan commitments (log). 
Marginal effects are conditioned to different values of Religious Tensions. Dashed lines denote the upper and 
lower boundaries of the 90% confidence interval. 
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Figure 9: Conditional Marginal Effects of Shia Regime on IsDB Commitments, Country 
Fixed Effects Excluded, 90% Confidence Interval 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows the marginal effects of Shia population (dummy) on IsDB loan commitments (log). 
Marginal effects are conditioned to different values of Religious Tensions. Dashed lines denote the upper and 
lower boundaries of the 90% confidence interval. 
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Figure 10: Conditional Marginal Effects of Shia Regime on IsDB Commitments, 
Country Fixed Effects Included, 90% Confidence Interval 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows the marginal effects of Shia population (dummy) on IsDB loan commitments (log). 
Marginal effects are conditioned to different values of Religious Tensions. Dashed lines denote for upper and 
lower boundaries of the 90% confidence interval. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: List of Countries included 
 
Afghanistan Egypt Malaysia Sierra Leone 
Albania Gabon Maldives Somalia 
Algeria Gambia Mali Sudan 
Azerbaijan Guinea Mauritania Surinam 
Bahrain Guinea-Bissau Morocco Syria 
Bangladesh Indonesia Mozambique Tajikistan 
Benin Iran Niger Togo 
Brunei Iraq Nigeria Tunisia 
Burkina Faso Jordan Oman Turkey 
Cameroon Kazakhstan Pakistan Turkmenistan 
Chad Kuwait Palestinian Adm. Areas Uganda 
Comoros Kyrgyz Republic Qatar United Arab Emirates 
Cote d’Ivoire Lebanon Saudi Arabia Uzbekistan 
Djibouti Lybia Senegal Yemen 
Notes: Countries shown in bold are Muslim majority populated.   
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Appendix 2: Data definition and sources 
 
Variables Description Source 
IsDB commitments IsDB loan commitments received by a 
borrowing member in a year in constant 
dollars. 
IsDB Annual Report 
(various years), 
OECD (2012). 
WB commitments World Bank loan commitments received by a 
borrowing member in a year in constant 
dollars. 
OECD (2012). 
Population  Total population. World Bank (2012). 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in current dollars. World Bank (2012). 
Democracy Dummy coded 1 if government is democratic, 
and 0 otherwise.  
Cheibub et al. (2010). 
Civil war Dummy coded 1 if recipient undergoes a civil 
war, and 0 otherwise.  
Gleditsch et al. 
(2002). 
Saudi Arabia aid Saudi Arabia bilateral aid received by a 
borrowing member in a year in constant 
dollars. 
OECD (2012). 
Trade to GDP Sum of merchandise exports and imports in 
percentage of GDP. 
World Bank (2012). 
Oil production Value of oil production in constant dollars. De Soysa and 
Binningsbo (2012) 
International  
Reserves to GDP 
International reserves in percentage of total 
GDP. 
World Bank (2012). 
Debt crisis  Dummy coded 1 if recipient undergoes a debt 
crisis, and 0 otherwise. 
Laeven and Valencia 
(2012). 
Sunni population Dummy coded 1 if religious affiliation of at 
least 50% of the population is Sunni Islam, and 
0 otherwise.  
Pew Research Center 
(2009a, 2000b). 
Shia population Dummy coded 1 if religious affiliation of at 
least 50% of the population is Shia Islam, and 0 
otherwise. 
Pew Research Center 
(2009a, 2000b). 
Other population Dummy coded 1 if religious affiliation of at 
least 50% of the population is not Islam (any 
sect), and 0 otherwise. 
Pew Research Center 
(2009a, 2000b). 
Sunni regime Dummy coded 1 if religious affiliation of 
borrowing member government in a year is 
Sunni Islam, and 0 otherwise. 
CIA World Fact Book 
(2013), Encyclopedia 
Britannica (2012). 
Shia regime Dummy coded 1 if religious affiliation of 
borrowing member government in a year is 
Shia Islam, and 0 otherwise. 
CIA World Fact Book 
(2013), Encyclopedia 
Britannica (2012). 
Other regime Dummy coded 1 if religious affiliation of 
borrowing member government in a year is not 
Islam (any sect), and 0 otherwise. 
CIA World Fact Book 
(2013), Encyclopedia 
Britannica (2012). 
Religious Tensions Religious Tensions Index, from 0 (highest) to 6 
(lowest). 
International Country 
Risk Guide (2012). 
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Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dv. Minimum Maximum 
IsDB commitments (log) 346 15.25 1.48 6.11 17.58 
WB commitments (log) 448 10.56 8.25 0.00 21.68 
Population (log) 427 15.65 1.64 11.89 19.24 
GDP per capita (log) 398 6.95 1.40 4.68 10.93 
Democracy (dummy) 420 0.13 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Civil war (dummy) 420 0.24 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Saudi Arabia aid (log) 448 2.82 4.39 0.00 19.25 
Trade/GDP 383 58.37 31.38 10.40 213.19 
Oil production (log) 429 12.98 10.35 0.00 25.86 
International Reserves/GDP 363 13.84 14.96 0.09 141.46 
Debt crisis  (dummy) 417 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.25 
Sunni populous (dummy) 430 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Shia populous (dummy) 430 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Other populous (dummy) 430 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Sunni regime (dummy) 430 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Shia regime (dummy) 430 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Other regime (dummy) 430 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Religious Tensions 257 3.52 1.41 0.00 6.00 
 
